Can Expected Utility Theory Explain Gambling?
Accounting for gambling is a significant challraige to theories of decision-making under uncertainty, particularly in a dynamic setting. If expected utility theory is to be used to model decision-making under uncertainty, the only way to explain simultaneous gambling and insurance is to introduce nonconcave segments into the utility function. Tiiis approach was first taken by Milton Friedman and Leonard J. Savage (1948) , who used a utility function with a single convex segment accompanied by a justification of this shape. They demonstrated that a utility ftmction which included a section with increasing marginal utility could account for the existence of consumers who purchase both insurance and lottery tickets.
Expected utility theory with a nonconcave utility function remains the most pjoisimonious moitel of behavior under uncertainty diat allows for ganBft)ling. However, its explanatory power was challenged by Martin I. Bailey et al. (1980) , who argued that nonc(»icave utility functions could not, in principle, e}q>lain gambling. Hie intuition bdiind their argun^tnt is simple. Consider the Friedman-Savage utility function v shown in Figme 1 together with the common tangent to the curve at the points c and c. We write Cv for the concave hull of v in which the graph of v is bridged by the common tangent between c and c. An agent at c can move \j^ from v(c) to Cv(c) by buying a fair gamble between c and c. When there are two periods, die agent has an altem^ve possibility: save by coilsuming c in the initial period to finance consumption of c in the second, or borrow to suj^rt ccmsumjrtion of c in the first period and c in the second period. When the rates of interest and time {Heference are equal, this does just as well as gambling. When they diffor, one of these alternatives is strictly preferred to gambling.
Unfortumuely, diis argument has two defects. First, the required pattern of saving or borrowing is only feasible if income is chosen appro{Hiately. For example, when the rates of interest and time preference are bc^ zero, the amount saved in the first period must equal the increase in consunq>tion in die seccHid period. This requires diat income be equal to (c + c)/2. For all odio-income levels there will be gambles strictly preferred to the optimal pattern of saving and borrowing. This conclusion continues to hold when the rates of interest and time preference are equal and positive aldiough there are now two exceptional income levels corresponding to saving or bonowing. The second defect is diat Bailey et al. (1980) faUed to allow for die possibility that an agent may wish to save or borrow as weU as gambling. Permitting gambling as well as saving and borrowing can restore a demand for gambles even when saving
or borrowing is strictly preferred to gambling. This follows from the observation that opdmal saving and borrowing without gambling will typically lead to a consumption level different from c and c in at least one period. In any period in which tbe consumption lies strictly between c and c, total expected udlity can be increased by gambling in tbat jjeriod as this shifts expected utility upwards on to the common tangent. Hence a demand for gambles is restored.
In this paper, we extend the model of Bailey et al, (1980) by allowing agents to gamble as well as save and borrow. With this extension, the analysis shows that expected udlity with nonconcave utility funcdons can explain the desire to gamble even widi perfect capital markets and dme-separable udlity funcdons. A demand for gambles will persist in our model when the rates of interest and time preference are equal unless income happens to take one of a finite set of excepdonal values. When the rates differ, there will be a range of income levels for which there is a demand for gambles. However, as in Bailey et al, (1980) , repeated gambling can not be explained in the model without invoking market failure.
Discomfort with the notion of increasing meirginal utility of market goods has led several authors to offer a foundation for nonconcavides of the Friedman-Savage type using indivisibilides in markets such as capital-market imperfecdons (Young Cbin Kim, 1973) and educadon (Yew-Kwang Ng, 1965) or labor supply (Ian M. Dobbs, 1988) . Bruno Jullien and Bernard Salanie (2000) show that a sample of racetrack bettors exhibit local risk aversion similar to that arising from Friedman-Savage utility functions, within the context of cumulative prospect theory. These explanations and observations imply nonconcave functions of wealth but are vulnerable to the idea tbat borrowing and saving can transform them into a concave function. In direct response to the Bailey et al. (1980) cridque, Richard S. Dowell and Keith R, McLaren (1986) sbow how a model in which wage rates increase with work experience can lead to a Friedman-Savage function of nonhuman wealth without invoking market imperfections.
The principal altemative explanadon of gambling is that it offers direct consumpdon value. It is useful to distinguish two forms of this assumpdon. Firstly, and most simply, the utility of nonmonetary activities associated witb gambling such as attending a race meeting or viewing a lotter\'-related television program when one has a stake in the outcome, could be included directly in the calculadons. Historically, this approach has consisted of little more than infonnal comments, but more recently Jonathan Simon (1998) has used an explicit "dream" function to model demand for lotto dckets. Johnnie E. V. Johnson et al, (1999) have estimated such a function for betting on horse races using data from bookmakers. These authors also point out punters' behavior which is hard to rationalize without invoking sucb a funcdon.
The other form of the assumption modifies expected udlity theory by supposing that the money values and probabilides in any risky prospect have direct value beyond that included in the expression for expected udlity. A particularly elegant version was presented by John Conlisk (1993) , who demonstrated that adding an arbitrarily small function of the money values and probabilides to an otherwise concave utility function could explain risk-preferring behavior such as the purchase of lotter\' dckets. Other nonexpected utility theories may explain features of gambling, such as tbe nature of tbe prizes in lottery games, which are hard to justify using expected utility tbeory. (See John Qiiiggin, 1991.) However, these approaches are not without difficuldes. It is unclear whether dream functions should be applied to all risky decisionmaking as in Conlisk (1993) or only to, say, unfair gambles with very long odds such as are found in lotto games as in Simon (1998) . The possibility leaves many other forms of gambling unexplained. However, a universallŷ^l kd dream function only partially determines how the characteristics of the gamble, such as the size of prizes, probability of winning, time at which uncertainty is resolved, etc., could be explained. Without a clear prescriptioa, relad&g demand for similar but not identical gambles-^for example, a gamble which is a naeaii-iseserving risk spre^ of another, or analysis of portfolio effects arising firom laying fixed odds and spread bets on the same sporting event-becomes a difficult task. Rather than explain gambling, it is all too easy to impose observed behavior by suitable choice of a dream functicm. Furdiermore, the dynamic c(xisistency of such models is controversial (see Mark J. Machina, 1989) , which makes their application in intertemporal models problematic.
The rest of the paper describes our extension of the model of B^ey et al. (1980) and analyses its properties. In Section I we formulate the consumer's optimization problem when gambtes are available and demonstrate how this {xoblem may be solved in terms of a related deterministic {»-(^lem. This construction allows us to relate lite indifference maps when gambling is possible and when it is excluded and these results ste applied to an analysis of twoperiod {Hxiblems in Secticm n. In Section in, we outline results for more than two periods. In Section IV we show that the model cannot explain repeated gambling without introducing some market imperfection and investigate how different borrowing and lendii^ rates may overcome this problem. Our conclusions are stated in Section V.
I. Sdvng die Multiperiod Problem

A, Methodology
Our approach is in three steps, I, We write down the multiperiod optimization I^oblem facing a consumer who can borrow and save in a perfect capital market and has a separable utility function in which intrapehod preferences are reflected in a nonconcave utility function. We refer to the optimal solution of this problem, when no gambles are available, as the no-gambling solution.
2. We extend the previous optimization problem by allowing consumers access to fair gambles with any pattan of payoffs. This is our extension of the nK)del of Bailey et al, (1980) . The solution to this problem is simply referred to as optimal. 3. We ask whether the optimal objective values of the two problems are the same, i.e., is the no-gambling solution optimal?
A negative answer to the final question implies a positive demand for fair gambles and, by continuity, for some imfair gambles. Whether this will actually result in gambling depends on the supply side of the gambling market which is not analyzed here.^ We therefore interpret a negative answer to 3 as support for the explanatory power of Friedman-Savage or more general nonconcave von Neumann-Morgenstem utility functions.
B. The No-Gambling Solution
Since we wish to demonstrate that nonconcave utility functions can explain gambling even when utility functions are separable, we will follow Bailey et al. (1980) in assuming a von Neumann-Morgenston utility function of the form (1) (1 + where c, is consumption in period f(= 1, ... , 7") and T/ > 0. We assume that v is strictly increasing but not necessarily concave.^ In Figure I , we graph both v and its concave hull Cv for the classic Friedman-Savage utility function. The nonconcavity of v means that there will be consumption levels c satisfying v(c) < Cv{c) and we write (c, c) for die set of all such ' However, it can be shown that if enough consumers with identical preferences demand an unfair gamble they will be able to increase their individual expected utilities bybetting with each odier, We also assume that either v is defined for all c or there is a minimum acceptable consuniption level (which we fix arbitrarily at 0) at which v ai^noaches -==, This assumption, made for expositional convenience, avoids comer solutions which complicate but do not substantially modify our conclusions. consumption levels." For such a c. the consumer will prefer to the status quo a gamble in which the ex post wealth is either c or c and the probability' of winning is chosen to make the gamble fair. Indeed, there will be unfair gambles giving an expected utilit>' greater than vie). It is also convenient to assume that for c < c or c > f the consumer is risk averse: the Friedman-Savage function contains no linear sections . "* Assuming perfect capital markets with rate of interest r, the optimal solution in the absence of gambling is found by maximizing U subject to 1 + ry where y* is permanent income.
C. Consumer's Optimization Problem
We now introduce the possibility of gambling by allowing the consumer to increase her wealth in period t by choosing any random variable X, satisfy'ing EX, = 0 for f = 1 T. We also permit the consumption decision in period t to depend on the outcome of the gamble X, and random events in previous periods. This makes consumption in any period a random variable and we place no restrictions on the joint distribution of (Xj. C, X7-. C7-.)." We also require the budget constraint (2) to be satisfied for ever\' sample path. Thus, the consumer" s optimization problem for T periods, which we abbreviate to CP^. becomes ' viC.) max (1 -vy
where the maximization is with respect to Xj, Cj. ... , Xj-, Cj^. This can be thought of as choosing the optimal joint distribution of these random variables.
D. Solving the Consumer's Problem
This problem can be solved by an indirect approach. Substituting Cvfor idnCP^ yields an upper bound to the original problem since Cv > t/. Furthermore, the concavity of Cv and linearity of the constraint allows us to replace the random variables with their expected values without reducing the value of the objective function.* This shows that the following deterministic problem, which we shall refer to as the deterministic equivalent of CP^. yields an upper bound for CP'^: max subject to subject to equation (2).
However, we can construct a solution (X,. C, Xj. Cj) of CP^ which achieves this upper bound, and is therefore optimal, as follows. Let (Cj. ... , C7-) be the optimal solution of the deterministic equivalent and write I^ for the degenerate random variable which takes the value X with certaint\. For each f = 1 T. two cases are possible.
Case 1: r(c,) = Cvic,).
Let X, = IQ and C, = /..
Case 2: vie,) < Cz'ic,).
Let X, take the value c, -c. with probability 1 --and c -c,. with probability TT. where
-For the standard Friedman-Savage function, the set ot c for which vlo < Cvic) is a connected set. However, the results in the paper do not depend on this propert\: the proofs below may be modified to cope with the general case.
"* This assumption avoids "'thick'" indifference cunes in the subsequent analysis.
' It is natural also to require independence of C, and .Y. ^ I Xj-but doing so has no effect on our conclusions.
c. -c_ -= -
c -c and let C, = c, + X,.
Note that, in Case 2. E^, = 0 as required, and In this secdon we describe a gnq>hical approach to pnMems with two periods. The starting point is die utility fimcdon for the problem with no gmnbling:
The argument in the previous secdon shows that CP^ has die same objecdve funcdon value as its determinisdc equivalent and solving the latter involves sid>sdtuting Cw for u in (3), Thus, for any reference level of udlity, we can draw a cone^onding pair of v-and Cv-indifference curves. In Figure 2 , we display a pair of indifferraice curves^ corresponding to die same utility level, where v has the shiqie shown in Figure  1 , Indifference curve I, drawn as a solid line, is for V and I*, drawn dashed where it differs from I, is for Cv. We note that indifference curve I does not "fill in" the indentadon in I*,
We also include (drawn dotted) the four lines c, = c_ and c, = c for / = 1, 2, These lines divide the posidve quadrant of the plane into nine regions. The central square includes all consumpdon vectors corresponding to gamAlthough the curves drawn have a section bowed away ftom the oiigin, this is not necessarily the case for aH indifference curves. Mathematica notebooks containing complete iadaiiaeact maps and other dia^ams (including the locus L intrtxfaKed below) based on specific Aincticmal forms are available from the authors.
FIGURE 2. TWO-PERIOD INDIFFERENCE CURVES
bling in both periods. In this region, Cv is linear in both periods so that all Ci^indifference curves have the same slope: -(1 -l-T)) throughout the square. In the four comer regions there is no gambling in either period and indifference curves of v and Cv for the same level of udlity coincide. The East (cj > c, c < C2 < c) and West regions correspond to gambling only in the second period and the North and South regions to gambling only in the first period. If I passes through (Cj, C2) where c_< Ci<c, then v(c{) < Cv(Ci) and there is a secdon of I* lying closer to the origin than (Cj, C2), Similar conclusions hold if c < C2 < c proving:
OBSERVATION 1: Except in the four comer regions, including their boundaries, a Cvindifference curve lies strictly below (i.e., on the origin side of) the v-indifference curve corresponding to the same utility level.
We have also included in Figure 2 (marked with dots and dashes) the iso-slope locus, * L, of all points (Cj, C2) for which v'(cy) = v'{c2). L is also the set of points at which the slope of the vindifference curves is -(1 -H rj) and therefore ' Although we have drawn L as a bounded, symmetric curve (plus the 45° line) only the symmetry is a universal iw^wrty. It is quite possible for it to vary widely in shape and even be unbounded.
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where the first-order conditions for maximizing U subject to the intertemporal budget constraint: 
then t''(c,) and v'icn) lie on the same horizontal line. Since this is also true of v'{c_) and v'(c). at most one of Cj and C2 can fall outside the interval (c. c).
Combining this result with Observation 2 gives:
OBSERVATION 3: Ifviy*) < Cviy*). nogambling solutions for r = r} cannot lie in the interior of a corner region.
B, The Optimality of No-Gambling Solutions
Throughout this subsection, we assume that i'(v*) < Cviy"^). We first examine the case r = T). Observation 3 implies that a tangency point between the budget line (4) and a i*-indifference curve cannot lie in the interior of a comer region, Observ ation 1 allows us to conclude that, unless the tangency point happens to be a comer point of the central square, there are points on the Ct>-indifference curve with the same utility level which lie closer to the origin than the tangency point. Thus, the same utility° However, not all points on L are no-gambling solutions. The 45= line is always pan of the locus but, where the indifference cune is concave to the origin as it crosses this line, the second-order conditions are not satisfied. Even points where the second-order conditions are satisfied may be onlv local maxima. level may be achieved in the interior of the budget set when gambhng is allowed so the no-gambling solution is suboptimal. This is illustrated in Figure 2 where the nogambling solution is at the intersection of I and L in the East region whereas the set of tangency points between the budget line and the corresponding Ct'-indifference curve is AB, An exceptional case where the i»-indifference curve passes through the point (c, c) is shown in Figure 4 , Here. A = (c. c) is optimal but the slope of both curves at A is -(1 -!-17). The complete set of optimal solutions is the line segment AB. Hence there is an optimal nogambling solution although there are altemative optimal solutions which do involve gambling. TTiese are the only exceptions and occur only if one of these comers happens to lie on the budget line which requires that We now tum to the case r # TJ. When r = TJ, the tangency set between the budget line, which has slope -(1 -t-TJ), and the optimal Cvindifference curve is the set ADB in Figure  2 . As r increases above [decreases below] TJ, the budget line rotates [counterjclockwise. The tangency point with the Cw-indifference curve always lies above the 45° line and moves away from it. This is illustrated in Figure 5 , where we have redrawn the indifference curves from Figure 2. For the budget line Bj, the optimal solution is Al and it is clear that the no-gambling solution is suboptimal. The point A2 is optimal for the budget line B2. Aj is also the nogambling solution but only in a trivial sense: the optimal solution does not involve gambhng in spite of the nonconcavity of v. We may conclude that, provided r -TJ is not too large, there is a range of incomes for which forbidding gand)ling makes consumers worse off and thus for which there is a demand for unfair gambles. This remains true even for the exceptional cases, (5), identified above: an examination of the indifference curves from Figure 4 shows set of exceptional values) to functions with several nonconcave segments and to more than two periods, using a more formal argument, which we omit. Proofs are available from the audiors on request. that if r > rj, all globally optimal solutions lie on both curves whereas, if r < TJ, there are income levels for which the no-gambling solution is suboptimal. We have established the following result.
THEOREM 2: There is a b > Q such that, if r # TJ and |r -TJ| < S, there is a range of income levels for which the no-gambling solution is suboptimal.
C. Pure Gambling
In this subsection, we look at the two-period problems studied by Bailey et al. (1980) , who compared the no-gambling solution with pure gambling, i.e., without intertemporal subsdmdon, and claimed that the former would be preferred (weakly if r = TJ).
When r = TJ, we can carry out the comparison in Figure 2 . The budget line coincides with the optimal Ci^indifference curve in the central square so that the pure-gambling soludon is found at the intersecdon of the indifference curve and the 45° line (point D in the figure). Unless this curve passes through (c, c) or (c. c). it lies below the Li-indifference cur\'e with the same udlity level by Observadon 1, in which case D is preferable to the no-gambling solution. Hence, unless income happens to satisfy (5)," pure gambling is strictly preferred to borrowing and saving.
WTien r * TJ, the results are ambiguous. In Figure 6 we have drawn Ci^ and i^indifference curves for the same utility level as well as two possible budget lines passing through the point D, where the Ci»-indifference curve crosses the 45° line. For BjBj, pure gambling is preferable to borrowing and saving whereas, for B2B2, the converse is true. Indeed, as the budget line through D rotates clockwise beginning at a low angle with the horizontal axis, it starts by crossing the corresponding ii-indifference cur\e. Then, after reaching a critical slope, where it is a tangent, it ceases to cross the i>-indifference cur\'e. This condnues undl a second tangency point is reached after which the w-indifference cur\'e is crossed again. This means that there will be interest rates r^, and ru{>r^) such that, if r^, < r < r^, then pure gambling is preferred to borrowing and saving whereas, if r < r^ or r > r^. preferences are reversed.'"
Ill, More Than Two Periods
The results of the previous section extend to more than two periods. WTien income lies between £ and c and the rates of interest and time preference are equal there will sdll be a demand for gambles. In particular, the no-gambling soludon of CP^, for r > 2, is subopdmal provided income does not fall in a finite set of exceptional values. However, this set grows exponentially larger as the number of periods increases, for excepdonal income levels correspond to a consumption pattern equal to either c or c in each of the T periods. This leads to 2^^ -2 such values between c and c. Furthermore, as T increases the excepdonal values fill in the inter\'al (c, c) and the per-period value of the optimal no-geimbling solution^' approaches Cf. " Bailey et al. (1980) implicitly assumed (5) in their argument.
'^ If r = To or i\. the consumer is indifferent between the alternatives. '^ That is. the optimal no-gambling objective function divided by S).! d -TJ)"'. " This accords with the intuition behind the analysis of Bailey et al. (1980) , The more periods are available, the more closely the consumer can replicate the gamble which moves her from V onto Cf using a feasible pattern of determinisdc consumpdon. Such a conclusion suggests that the demand for gambles will disappear if the number of periods is allowed to become infinite. Confirmadon of this suggesdon may be found in a detailed analysis of the infinite horizon case carried out in Farrell and Hardey (2000) . The conclusions of the previous section also extend to more than two periods when the rates of interest and time preference differ. Provided this difference is not too great, the optimal solution of the deterministic equivalent of CP^ entails consumption at a level between c and c in some period for a range of incomes. Employing the standard construction we find that the optimal solution of CP^ requires the consumer to gamble in that period. Hence, there will be a range of incomes for wbich the no-gambling solution is subopdmal and a demand for gambles will persist for 7" > 2, By contrast witb the result when interest and time preference rates are equal, this demand does not go away as the number of periods approaches infinity. For a set of incomes, consumers will demand gambles even if the number of periods is unlimited.
rv. Repeated GambUiig
Although a positive demand for gambling is predicted for Friedman-Savage utility functions, when r # TJ, expected utility theory still has difficulty in explaining repeated gambling. For a Frie(knan-Savage utility function, gambles will be den:Kuided in at most one period in CPb oth for finite or infinite 7". For T = 2, the fact that the budget line has slope -(1 + r) whilst the Ci>-indifference curves have slope -(1 + Tj) in the central square means that the optimal solution cannot lie in the central square and this rules out gambling in both periods. For general T, the result follows from the first-order conditions for the deterministic equivalent of CP^: (6) for r = 1, 2, ... , where A is a multiplier. Hr =T ), time can be at most one value of r for which the ri^t-hand side of (6) is equal to the slope of Cvinilie interval (c, c). Hence, c < c, < c for at nK)8t (me t which, by the stand^d construction, leads to a denumd for gambles in at most OIK period. Even when r = rj, although there can be optimal solutions involving gambling in every period, tte optimal solution is not unique and there will typically (e.g., for a FdedmanSavage utility fiiinction) be alternative q}timal sohitions widi a cfemand for gambling in at most one poiod.
In contrast to these theoretical predictions, periodic gambling behavior seems to be widespread. For example, participants in lotto games tsrpically purchase a small number of tickets each week rather than making a large purchase in a single week. The inability of the model to account for repeated gambling is a serious flaw and can only be avoided by modifying the objective function or the consti-aint (or both). The latter involves dnqqnng the assunq^on of a perfect market for brarowing and saving and we now show that an interest rate wedge can account for a demand fc»-gand)]ing in every period.
A. A Model With an Imperfect Market
We suppose that r^ and rjX<rB) are the borrowing and lending rates, respectively. The consumer's optimization problem (with market failure), which we shall write CMFP^, can then be written:
and Wj = 0, Wj+1 a 0, where W, represents accumulated wealth (or, if negative, delH) at the beginning of period r. We will apply the method of Section I by first noting that, since v is strictly increasing and r^ < rg, the equation for W,^ i can be replaced with , < (1 + , + y* + X, -without changing the set of optimal solutions of CMFP^.
Since the objective function can be regarded as a concave function of (W^, X^, Cj; ... ; WY, XJ, Cf, Wj^ j) and the inequality constraints are linear, we can apply Jensen's inequality'"* and areue as before that an optimal solution of CMFP^ problem can be obtained by solving the deterministic equival^it: c,)
followed by the standard construction to obtain a solution to CMFP^. To illustrate the applicadon of this result, consider Figure 7 in which we have drawn a budget line B,B, for CMFP". which has a kink at D where it crosses the 45" line and a slope of -(1 -rg) below and -(1 -r^) above D. Then D is the optimal solution of CMFP' provided the slope of the Ci'-indifference cur\e lies between the slopes of the two sections of the budget line which requires r^ < TJ :£ r^. We have established, for 7" = 2, the following theorem which is proved for general T in the Appendix.
THEOREM 3: //r^ < TJ < r^ and v(y*) < Cv(y*). then (v*. ... . y*) is an optimal solution of the deterministic equivalent of CMFPâ nd corresponds to gambling in every period.
If r^ > TJ [or TJ > rg] . the optimal solution of CMFP" is the same as in Section II with r = r^ [or r = rg]. In this case (and for general T) there will be at most one period of gambling.
We note that the soludons referred to in Theorem 3 predict gambhng or borrowing and saving but not both in each period. A more sophisdcated model is required to explain both borrowing or saving and gambling in every, or at least more than one, period.
V. Conclusion
It has not been our intention in this study to deny the explanator\' power of nonexpected udlity theories of decision-making or that gambling may offer direct consumption value. Rather, we have explored the extent to which expected utility theor\' with nonconcave udlity functions can account for gambling in an intertemporal setting and have demonstrated that the dieorx-can explain a desire for gambling even when capital markets are perfect and udlity funcdons are separable. Our arguments have not FIGURE 7. OPTIM.^L REPEATED Gi\MBLiNG exploited the fact that intra-period preferences are the same for all periods and we expect broadly similar conclusions to hold for more general preferences over consumption streams provided we maintain inter-period separability.
However, when the rates of interest and dme preference differ, it is opdmal to gamble in at most one period. Even when these rates are equal, consumers will prefer to gamble at most once, weakly if fair gambles are available and strictly if only unfair gambles can be bought. One way to account for repeated gambling using expected utility theory is to invoke market failure as in the preceding section.'^ An alternative approach is to permit inter-period interactions. This could change the results substantially. For example, if preferences in one period are positively related to previous consumption, as in Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy s (1988) model of rational addiction, repeated gambling is possible. Nevertheless, it would seem unlikely that habituation is the sole explanation for repeated gambling. An empirical study of lotto pardcipation by Farrell et al. (1999) finds evidence of habit formation, but its extent is small and appears '-See also the suggestion by Dowell and McLaren (1986) that in their model an individual unable to borrow against future earnings may repeatedly accumulate small sums with which to wager.
inadequate as a complete model of repeated purchase of lotto tickets.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 3:
We will show that the pressed soluti<m satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker ccmditions which, given the concave objective function and linear constraint, are necessary and sufficient for optimality. We are thus assuming differentiability of V (and therefore of Cv).
We 
